This history has made Assab the subject of a dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Within Ethiopia, the TPLF has been blamed for leaving the country without access to the sea. This is because a transitional government dominated by the TPLF accepted the 1993 referendum that established Eritrea as an independent state.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed argues that a population of 150 million cannot live in a geographic prison. Ethiopian rhetoric moves between seeking commercial access to the sea and asserting a historical claim to Assab. It portrays the acceptance of Eritrean independence without securing Ethiopian control of a port as the mistake that left Ethiopia without a coastline.
For Eritrea, Assab is not simply a port. Control of the coastline is part of the independence secured after 30 years of war against Ethiopia. When Ethiopian politicians present sea access as a historical right, Eritrea hears a possible claim to its territory.
Over time, port access, border control and armed opposition inside Ethiopia have become parts of the same confrontation.
Tigray is where these issues meet. It borders Eritrea. Western Tigray, a large part of Tigrayan territory, remains under Amhara administration and military control. Furthermore, Tigrayan forces have not fully disarmed. For the federal government, securing the border and disarming Tigrayan forces would reduce the risk of Eritrean support reaching Tigray or of Ethiopia facing two connected northern fronts.
The wartime alliance between Addis Ababa and Asmara during the Tigray war broke down after the Pretoria Agreement was signed in November 2022. One consequence is that Eritrea and the TPLF have found common ground against the federal government. No formal alliance has been announced. But reports of contacts and possible coordination, together with federal accusations of joint military preparations, suggest an informal tactical alignment. The TPLF has rejected claims that it is coordinating with Eritrea.
For Eritrea, continued conflict inside Ethiopia reduces the threat to Assab. A federal government fighting in the Amhara, Oromia and Tigray regions has fewer troops, less money and less political space to pressure Eritrea. Eritrea does not need a permanent alliance with the TPLF. Even limited cooperation can force Addis Ababa to focus on several internal fronts.
My analysis suggests that the Ethiopian government has made the opposite calculation. This is supported by federal government warnings that the TPLF is siding with Eritrea in a possible proxy war, an accusation the TPLF denies. But by presenting the TPLF as an Eritrean partner, the federal government can portray resistance to disarmament as a foreign-backed threat. This helps Addis Ababa defend its failure to fully implement the Pretoria Agreement and rally domestic support around national unity and sovereignty.
The federal accusation also creates a political logic for weakening the Tigray People’s Liberation Front before increasing pressure on Eritrea over the Assab port. I interpret this as a two-part sovereignty argument. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front can first be treated as an internal partner of a foreign enemy. The same defence of sovereignty can then support pressure on Eritrea over Assab.
Claims that Assab historically belongs to Ethiopia can make that pressure appear as recovery of national territory. This does not prove that the federal government has adopted such a military plan. It shows how the same sovereignty argument can be directed against both the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and Eritrea.
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front can make its own calculation. Hostility between Ethiopia and Eritrea gives the TPLF an opportunity to use possible Eritrean support as leverage to press Addis Ababa to implement the Pretoria Agreement. For Eritrea, supporting pressure from Tigray can weaken the Ethiopian government as it presses its claim to the Assab port.
Local observers in Tigray and Eritrea use the Tigrigna term Tsimdo for the reported cooperation between Eritrea and the TPLF. Its extent remains contested. But Addis Ababa treats the possibility as a security threat.
Red Sea rivalry keeps Pretoria on hold
The rivalry blocks the Pretoria Agreement at its most important point. The military implementation plan linked Tigrayan disarmament to the withdrawal of foreign forces and forces outside the federal army. Tigrayan forces were expected to surrender their weapons as the forces that threatened Tigray withdrew.
That exchange has been interrupted. Tigrayan actors ask why they should disarm while Western Tigray has not returned to Tigrayan administration. Keeping their weapons also provides protection if the tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea develops into war.
My analysis suggests that federal authorities may be reluctant to restore a strategically important area to a divided Tigrayan leadership. Restoring the area could also bring the federal government into confrontation with Amhara political and military actors and cost it Amhara political support.
Each side treats its own obligation as a loss of security and demands that the other move first.
And Western Tigray bears the heaviest cost of the impasse. More than 760,000 Tigrayans remain displaced. The dispute concerns not only where displaced people can live, but which regional authority will govern the area. Displaced people are therefore trapped inside a security contest they did not create.
Political exclusion makes armed power more valuable. Tigray did not take part in the 1 June 2026 election. Tigray People’s Liberation Front leaders who cannot bargain through parliament have stronger reasons to retain military leverage. Federal authorities can then cite that military power as evidence that Tigray is not ready for political reintegration.
Protect peace in Tigray from regional rivalry
Preventing another war requires two connected processes.
Ethiopia and Eritrea must address the Assab dispute peacefully, including access to the port, sovereignty and alleged support for armed groups. The Pretoria Agreement cannot carry the burden of a dispute that was not part of the peace deal.
In Tigray, the implementation of the peace deal needs a verifiable order: withdrawal of foreign forces and forces outside the federal army, restoration of Tigrayan administration in Western Tigray, safe return of displaced people, disarmament of Tigrayan forces and political reintegration.
These steps would narrow the opportunities created by Red Sea tension. Eritrea would have less room to use conflict in Tigray to constrain Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s federal government would have less reason to treat Tigrayan demands as foreign threats. Tigrayan forces would have less reason to seek Eritrean support as protection. Peace in Tigray depends on making implementation more valuable than continued uncertainty.
