Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea remain among the most consequential geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa. The historical relationship between the two states is deeply intertwined, shaped by shared cultural and historical ties but also by decades of conflict, mistrust, and divergent political trajectories. Since Eritrea’s formal independence in 1993 following the defeat of the Derg regime, relations between the two countries have oscillated between cautious cooperation and open hostility.

Three developments are particularly critical in understanding the current state of Ethiopia–Eritrea relations. First, Eritrea’s transformation from a state that once aspired to become the “Singapore of Africa” into one of the most authoritarian and economically stagnant regimes in the world. Second, Eritrea’s persistent involvement in regional conflicts and proxy wars across the Horn of Africa. Third, the evolving dynamics of Ethiopia–Eritrea relations in the aftermath of the Pretoria Agreement, which ended the devastating conflict in northern Ethiopia but introduced new strategic uncertainties.

Understanding these developments is essential not only for interpreting Eritrea’s domestic and foreign policy behavior but also for assessing their implications for Ethiopia’s long-term security, economic development, and regional diplomacy.

From “Africa’s Singapore” to One of the World’s Most Repressive States

When Eritrea achieved independence in 1993 under the leadership of Isaias Afwerki and the former liberation movement that later became the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), the country was widely perceived as a promising example of post-liberation state-building. Eritrean leaders articulated an ambitious vision to transform the country into the “Singapore of Africa”—a disciplined developmental state that would combine strategic governance, export-oriented industrialization, and strong national unity.

In the early years of independence, Eritrea appeared to possess several structural advantages. Compared to many newly independent African states, Eritrea inherited relatively well-developed infrastructure from the colonial period, including ports, transportation networks, and urban institutions. The port city of Assab had served as Ethiopia’s primary maritime outlet during the federation era, while Asmara was widely regarded as one of the most organized capitals in the region.

However, the trajectory of Eritrea’s state-building project soon diverged sharply from these initial aspirations. Rather than consolidating democratic institutions and market-oriented economic reforms, the Eritrean political system gradually evolved into one of the most centralized and authoritarian regimes in the world.

A key turning point occurred in the aftermath of the Eritrean–Ethiopian War between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The war resulted in an estimated 70,000–100,000 casualties and severely disrupted both economies. In Eritrea, the conflict became the justification for a permanent national mobilization strategy that profoundly reshaped the country’s governance structure.

One of the most controversial elements of this system is Eritrea’s policy of indefinite national service. Originally designed as an 18-month program aimed at nation-building, national service was transformed into an open-ended system of military and labor conscription. According to investigations conducted by the United Nations Human Rights Council, the system effectively functions as forced labor, with conscripts assigned to military units, construction projects, and state-owned enterprises for years or even decades.

The consequences for Eritrean society have been severe. Eritrea has experienced one of the highest rates of outward migration in the world relative to its population. Hundreds of thousands of Eritrean citizens—particularly young people—have fled the country in search of economic opportunity and political freedom. Eritreans consistently rank among the largest groups of asylum seekers in Europe and neighboring African states.

International assessments consistently place Eritrea at the bottom of global rankings for political freedoms and media independence. Organizations such as Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders classify Eritrea as one of the most restrictive political environments in the world. Independent newspapers were shut down in 2001 following the arrest of reformist officials known as the G-15, and no independent media outlets have operated legally in the country since.

Economically, the consequences of this authoritarian system have also been profound. While Eritrea possesses mineral resources such as gold, copper, and zinc, the broader economy remains highly centralized and dependent on remittances from the diaspora. Private enterprise operates under severe constraints, foreign investment remains limited, and economic growth has been inconsistent.

Despite early aspirations to become the ‘Singapore of Africa,’ Eritrea’s post-independence trajectory has diverged sharply from the vibrant model established by its namesake. While Singapore transformed from a resource-poor outpost into a global economic titan following its independence from British rule and its subsequent separation from Malaysia, Eritrea has become a stagnant, militarized state. Instead of fostering a regional trading hub, the current regime has stifled growth through a centralized command economy that functions more as a private enterprise for Isaias Afwerki’s inner circle than as a national development engine. This persistent isolation and the suppression of private enterprise have left Eritrea’s strategic Red Sea coastline vastly underutilized, serving the survival of a single family rather than the prosperity of its people or the stability of the Horn of Africa.

For Ethiopia and the wider Horn of Africa, Eritrea’s internal political trajectory has had significant external implications. The consolidation of a highly securitized state structure has encouraged the Eritrean regime to rely heavily on external conflict narratives as a means of sustaining domestic legitimacy.

Eritrea as a Conflict Exporter in the Horn of Africa

Since gaining independence, Eritrea’s regional strategy has frequently been characterized by confrontational diplomacy and support for armed movements across the Horn of Africa. This pattern has contributed significantly to regional instability and has repeatedly drawn international scrutiny.

Eritrea’s first external military confrontation occurred in the mid-1990s when it engaged in a territorial dispute with Yemen over the strategically important Hanish Islands in the Red Sea. Although the dispute was ultimately resolved through international arbitration, it established a precedent for Eritrea’s willingness to use military force in regional disputes.

The most consequential conflict, however, was the border war with Ethiopia from 1998 to 2000. The conflict fundamentally reshaped the political relationship between the two states and entrenched a long period of hostility known as the “no peace, no war” era. During the subsequent years, Eritrea adopted a strategy aimed at weakening Ethiopia through indirect means, including support for Ethiopian armed opposition groups.

International investigations have documented Eritrea’s involvement in several proxy conflicts across the region. In Somalia, Eritrea was accused by the United Nations Security Council of supporting militant factions during the Somali civil war. These allegations contributed to the imposition of international sanctions on Eritrea in 2009. Investigations by the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) initially found evidence that Eritrea provided financial and logistical support to Al-Shabaab, which the international community recognizes as a terrorist organization.

Eritrea has also been implicated in border tensions with Djibouti, particularly during the 2008 confrontation around Ras Doumeira. These conflicts have reinforced Eritrea’s reputation as one of the most militarized states in the region.

More recently, Eritrea’s role in regional security dynamics has extended to the ongoing war in Sudan. The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has attracted involvement from multiple regional actors. Within Ethiopia itself, Eritrea’s support for anti-government armed movements has been a persistent concern for Ethiopian security planners. For decades, Eritrea provided sanctuary and logistical assistance to several Ethiopian insurgent groups. Although relations briefly improved after the 2018 rapprochement between the two countries, recent developments suggest that elements of this strategy may be re-emerging.

The cumulative effect of these policies has been to position Eritrea as a significant source of geopolitical volatility in the Horn of Africa. Instead of functioning as a partner in regional integration initiatives such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Eritrea has frequently pursued an isolationist strategy that prioritizes regime security over cooperative regional development.

Post-Pretoria Dynamics in Ethiopia–Eritrea Relations

The signing of the Pretoria Agreement marked a decisive turning point in Ethiopia’s internal political landscape. The agreement, facilitated by the African Union, brought an end to two years of devastating conflict between the Ethiopian federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.

For Ethiopia, the Pretoria Agreement represented a critical step toward national stabilization and reconstruction. For Eritrea, however, the agreement created new strategic uncertainties.

During the two-year Tigray conflict, the Ethiopian government reported that Eritrean forces forcefully intruded into the Tigray region, taking advantage of a security vacuum to commit grave crimes against a vulnerable population. The government noted that because federal forces were fully engaged in active combat against TPLF units, it was unable to provide the necessary protection for the people of Tigray during this incursion. Consequently, the cessation of hostilities under the Pretoria Agreement served as a vital corrective, reasserting Ethiopian sovereignty and dismantling Eritrea’s unchecked influence in northern Ethiopia.

In recent remarks delivered to the Ethiopian Parliament, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed acknowledged that Eritrean troops remain present in specific areas of the Tigray region long after the signing of the Pretoria Agreement. He called upon both the Eritrean government and the international community to ensure the immediate withdrawal of these forces, asserting that Ethiopia is prepared to take necessary measures to protect its people and territory should diplomatic avenues fail to resolve the situation.

Simultaneously, Ethiopia has intensified its pursuit of historical and legitimate maritime access, a right that was unjustly severed due to the historical errors surrounding Eritrea’s secession. While the Ethiopian government maintains that re-establishing a sea outlet is a legal and existential necessity for its 130 million people, the Eritrean regime has interpreted this strategic rise as a direct threat. Instead of engaging in constructive regional cooperation, Asmara has doubled down on its isolationist tendencies, most notably through its recent withdrawal from IGAD, effectively closing the door on multilateral diplomacy.

Rather than pursuing a path of shared prosperity, Eritrea has defaulted to its traditional strategy of containment and ‘choking’ Ethiopia’s economic ambitions. This is evidenced by its recent military and diplomatic alignment with Egypt—Ethiopia’s historical contender over the Abay River (Nile). This alliance is widely viewed as a reactionary response to the successful completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), as Eritrea and Egypt find common ground in attempting to constrain Ethiopia’s anchoring status in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin.

Conclusion

More than three decades after Eritrea’s independence, the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea remains defined by unresolved tensions and divergent political trajectories. Eritrea’s transformation—from a state that once aspired to become the “Singapore of Africa” into one of the world’s most repressive regimes—has fundamentally shaped its domestic governance and aggressive regional behavior. By relying on permanent militarization, proxy conflicts, and confrontational diplomacy, the Eritrean regime has repeatedly undermined stability in the Horn of Africa, a fragility further exposed by the shifting dynamics following the Pretoria Agreement.

Despite the hardline and stifling nature of the current Eritrean administration, the long-term prosperity of both nations depends on a transition toward a cooperative framework. Ethiopia and Eritrea stand to gain immensely from genuine peace accords that prioritize regional integration over zero-sum security strategies. For Ethiopia, the strategic challenge lies in navigating this complex environment by strengthening diplomatic partnerships with neighbors like Djibouti, Kenya, and Sudan, while simultaneously keeping the door open for a future defined by economic interdependence rather than isolation.

Ultimately, the future of the Horn of Africa hinges on breaking the cycle of conflict. By positioning itself as the central pillar of peace and development, Ethiopia can lead the regional shift toward a cooperative order rooted in mutual security and maritime synergy. While the current regime in Asmara remains a volatile actor, Ethiopia’s decisive leadership in pursuing diplomatic avenues and economic integration remains the only viable path toward a stable and integrated Red Sea basin.

 By Azaria Binyam, IFA