The Recognition of Somaliland: Israel’s Hand is Not Alone

On December 26, Israel announced its recognition of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state, becoming the first member of the “international community” to do so. In 1991, following the outbreak of the civil war in Somalia, Somaliland proclaimed its independence, though it had remained unrecognized until now. The line followed by the “international community”—from regional countries to global powers, as well as various international and intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, the African Union, the Arab League, the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation), and IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), of which Mogadishu is a member—has always been that of “One Somalia.” Somalia considers Somaliland as part of its territory, specifically one of the seven republics of its federal Constitution. Nevertheless, an unrecognized state could not have survived for over thirty years without certain cross-cutting and often unexpected support: as we shall see in more detail, Israel has been one of these supporters, and in its case, a rather overt one.

Benjamin Netanyahu spoke of a “historic moment,” informing Somaliland’s President, Abdirahman Abdullahi, that he expects him for a visit to Israel shortly. The following day, December 27, South Sudan also announced its intention to recognize Somaliland. This news is unsurprising, given that South Sudan owes its 2010 independence from Sudan—making it the youngest African state—precisely to Israel and the United States. If the recognition of Somaliland succeeds, leading to its future UN membership, Hargeisa will join Juba as another satellite of Tel Aviv in a region—stretching from the Great Lakes through the Nile Valley to the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden—that has always been of immense strategic interest to Israel.

Although its official population is slightly over six million across an area of approximately 176,000 square kilometers, the reality of the nascent Somaliland republic, with its capital in Hargeisa, is far more diminished. Over the years, it has suffered numerous defections, with populations in the Sool and Sanaag regions reuniting with Mogadishu. Meanwhile, the announcement of recognition and the formalization of the “symbiosis” with Israel has triggered popular uprisings in Selel and Awdal among the secessionist Issa and the unionist Gadabursi, who favor a return to Somalia. The announcement of recognition for a Somaliland already significantly reduced compared to 1991 now leaves the Hargeisa government with a fragmented portion of territory, while Awdal proclaims itself a new state, seeking to become a member of the Federal Republic of Somalia. As is often the case, one must never “reckon without the host.”

For Israel, the interests leading to the recognition of Hargeisa’s independence—after having fueled it under the table for years alongside other partners—are strongly linked to the current geopolitical climate. Integrating the new state into the Abraham Accords (strongly backed by Washington, which aims to revive them alongside Tel Aviv despite their setbacks: the war that broke out on October 7, 2023, certainly did not see a Middle East aligned with Israel, which was their intended function) is a primary objective, though not the only one. Hargeisa has declared its willingness to move in this direction, with President Abdullahi defining accession to the Accords as “a step toward regional and global peace.” The prospect of massive new Israeli and American investments in infrastructure, agriculture, and technology is highly alluring for a state with a per capita GDP just over $1,300, limited access to international finance, an unemployment rate exceeding 70%, high emigration rates, and a clandestine currency—the Somaliland shilling—which lacks legal tender and is shunned even in Hargeisa in favor of the US dollar.

However, joining the Abraham Accords, alongside recognition, could also entail Somaliland’s acceptance of refugees from Gaza, who, according to Israeli and American plans, should leave the Strip in the largest numbers possible. Months ago, Washington and Tel Aviv approached Somaliland, as well as Somalia and other regional countries (such as Sudan, in exchange for aid to the government against the RSF—a paradox, considering these same countries, along with the US, support them), to accept a substantial quota. As of January 2025, estimates ranged between 100,000 and 500,000 Gazans to be sent to Somaliland; unofficial updates in March spoke of an initial quota of 50,000 to 100,000 by 2026. The US and Israel would “compensate for the trouble” by channeling funds to Hargeisa for housing structures, with further developments based on regional stability. These proposals, which remained “exploratory,” were rejected by various countries and faced strong international hostility. The even more unofficial hypothesis that Somaliland might now accept Palestinian refugees as a “token of love” toward Israel and the US faces massive practical difficulties: despite the heavy pressure Tel Aviv is exerting on Hargeisa, the local population is in turmoil, with a popular revolt aimed at dethroning President Abdullahi. Abdullahi, elected a year ago, is—like his predecessor Muse Bihi Abdi—a member of the Isaaq qabila (clan), of which the Republic of Somaliland is essentially private property. It is therefore easy to understand why other local clans do not wish to be part of it, in a state that, by formalizing its independence, would effectively kidnap them from the union with Somalia to which they remain loyal.

It would be a mistake, however, to view the recognition of Somaliland solely through the lens of the Abraham Accords and the potential transfer of Gazan civilians and militants. Israel’s strategic aims in the Horn of Africa and its coasts are not limited to this; they blend with those of its close regional partners, the UAE and Ethiopia. Since 2017, Abu Dhabi has been active through DP World in the port of Berbera, where it is currently financing expansions, including naval docks and joint military bases with Israel. The two countries already collaborate on Somaliland soil in intelligence and operations against the Houthis. It is not difficult to see how a more official, massive, and stable presence in the young African state is essential for both to limit the actions of Yemeni Shiites, combat them more effectively, and secure routes along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea toward the Israeli port of Eilat. In fact, for some time, taking advantage of Emirati control, Israel has been installing early warning radars in Berbera and on the nearby island of Zuqar, functional for intercepting Houthi rockets as well as monitoring Somali and Turkish naval movements. To this end, Israel also supplies Hargeisa with reconnaissance drones, primarily Hermes and Heron models. The UAE, besides financing its own expansion in Somaliland, is also willing to fund Israeli and Ethiopian interests there.

In January 2024, Addis Ababa announced an MoU with Hargeisa, whereby, in exchange for a naval and military base in Berbera, it would recognize Somaliland, thereby exerting influence over other partners and members of the African Union. It was already known then that Abu Dhabi, which maintains strong ties with Addis Ababa, would finance Ethiopian infrastructure in Somaliland. With that MoU, Ethiopia, acting as a “battering ram” for Israeli-Emirati strategies, would have created a precedent that Israel and the UAE could then more quietly and less controversially follow. However, opposition from countries like Egypt and Turkey—who sent and reinforced their presence in Somalia with strong diplomatic action—along with condemnation from both regional and global powers, led that proposal to a dead end. Now that things are moving again, the infamous MoU and its related Ethiopian expansionist goals (and the Israeli-Emirati ones hidden behind them) could become topical again, complete with recognition from Addis Ababa. Meanwhile, in June 2025, the construction of a railway from Ethiopia to Berbera was announced, financed by Abu Dhabi.

All these facilities (Israeli, Emirati, and Ethiopian, not to mention American: after all, only a few weeks ago, the head of AFRICOM, Gen. Dagvin R. M. Anderson, during his trip to the Horn of Africa, visited Somaliland alongside Ethiopia and Puntland) are not limited to countering the Houthis and their allies, primarily Iran. It is crucial for this entire alliance to control the routes between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, which find their weak link and bottleneck along the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden. Twelve percent of global wealth passes through that corridor, and the conflict in the Middle East has demonstrated its extreme fragility.

Furthermore, in 2023, the United States launched the IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor) to counter China’s BRI (Belt and Road Initiative). It connects India (which American goals intend to replace China as the West’s primary commercial partner and technological supplier, favoring “decoupling” from Beijing) to the UAE, crossing Saudi Arabia and Jordan to reach Israel’s Mediterranean coast, from where it would supply European and American markets. With its position near Bab el-Mandeb, Somaliland would strengthen this chain, containing Saudi influence in the area, which is currently accompanied by the expanding influence of Turkey and Egypt.

Then there is the “uninvited guest”: the famous Ben Gurion Canal, a project Israel and the US have worked on since the 1950s as an alternative to Suez, aimed at breaking the Egyptian monopoly over routes between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Crossing the Negev and the Sinai, its security and feasibility would require control of the Gaza Strip—which is why there is an aim to evacuate as much of the Gazan population as possible. After failed attempts to start work in the 60s, 70s, and 80s, Netanyahu’s government now wants to try again, seeing it as an element to guarantee its political survival and total success. The launch of IMEC could make a revival of the project more probable today. However, various practical difficulties (from the disarmament of Hamas to the actual deportation of Gazans, alongside hostility from regional countries and limitations imposed by the faltering American “Peace Plan”), combined with the high economic cost (estimated between $16 and $55 billion, up to $100 billion), make it an exceedingly “ambitious” project for now.

Another important piece guaranteed by the recognition of Somaliland and the consolidation of its symbiosis with Israeli and Emirati partners lies in the latter’s involvement in gold smuggling from Sudan and other areas of the continent, from the Great Lakes to the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. As recently reported, various studies from Chatham House to SwissAid show the UAE illicitly importing huge quantities of the “noble metal” from Sudan thanks to support for the RSF (at least 29 tons in 2025, a 70% increase over the previous year, though these are very conservative estimates). Along with gold taken from eastern Congo and channeled by the M23 through Rwanda and Uganda, or gold extracted illegally in Tigray or by groups like JNIM in Mali and Burkina Faso, one can grasp the scale of the volumes imported into the Emirates. It is no coincidence that Dubai is today considered the world’s primary hub for illegal African gold, with an “informal state economy” that constitutes a true “neocolonial industry.” What Cecil Rhodes once did, the Emirates and Israel are doing today, using partners like Somaliland, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, or Chad as their modern-day outposts.

To better secure the area between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, the Israeli-Emirati project to revise the geopolitical architecture is not limited to Somaliland. Alongside the recognition of its independence, Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi are overseeing a bellicose path intended to lead to the independence of a new state in eastern Sudan (corresponding primarily to Darfur and Kordofan, under the leadership of the RSF and their “Government of Peace and Unity”) and one in southern Yemen (under the leadership of the STC, the Southern Transitional Council, often referred to as al-Hirak). In this way, Israel and the UAE could claim to have finally completed a large part of their regional strategy, which involves the fragmentation of large and medium-sized African and Middle Eastern states.

This strategy is also welcomed by several non-local actors. Taiwan’s proximity to Somaliland is well known, and not just due to simple solidarity between “unrecognized countries.” The news of Hargeisa’s recognition was welcomed by Taipei, which sees it as a positive precedent for its own future. Since 2020, the two countries have maintained reciprocal representative offices that act as embassies in all but name, while in July 2025, Taipei and Hargeisa signed an agreement for cooperation between their coast guards to protect routes along the Gulf of Aden. From Taiwan, Somaliland receives surveillance drones, communication systems to monitor piracy, and above all, massive investments in technology, agriculture, and healthcare, making it Hargeisa’s primary financial partner. Other countries, from the UK (whose parliament regularly hosts Hargeisa delegations) to Canada, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, France, and Sweden, in addition to the aforementioned UAE, Israel, and Ethiopia, have maintained strong ties with Somaliland for years. This is how a “clandestine state” like Somaliland has been able to sustain itself for decades until its sudden emergence these days.

The excitement of Taiwanese independence advocates regarding the Somaliland precedent has not gone unnoticed by Beijing. China is among the many countries that have strongly condemned the Israeli decision. For Beijing, the precedent is dangerous and could facilitate a future recognition of Taiwan by the US or its “battering rams.” In response to the Hargeisa-Tel Aviv-Taipei axis, China has long expressed a position qualified as the One Somalia Policy. The principle of “One Somalia,” for Beijing, carries as much weight as “One China”: there is only one Somalia, with its capital in Mogadishu, just as there is only one China, with its capital in Beijing, as recognized by international law.

However, Beijing is not only driven by hostility toward any political precedent that could jeopardize Taiwan’s return to the Motherland, or the risk that new Israeli military settlements might threaten the BRI and routes along Bab el-Mandeb, as well as the Chinese base in Djibouti. Like its partners in the African Union, the Arab League, and the OIC, Beijing’s reaction is also triggered by the “geopolitics of destabilization” carried out by Israel, which it accuses of serving “forced displacement agendas,” and the immense humanitarian issues this entails. China has reiterated that it will not allow the suffering of Palestinians to be used to “alter the geographic and demographic reality” of the Horn of Africa and the Middle East.

Beijing has already begun to respond materially, announcing new military and infrastructure aid packages for Mogadishu. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it has informed that it will veto any attempt to admit Somaliland as a new member or to give international legitimacy to the Hargeisa-Tel Aviv agreements, while its navy (PLAN) has already intensified patrols in the Gulf of Aden.

Finally, there is Eritrea, a country in the region that has always supported Somalia due to an old debt of gratitude. During the years of the War of Independence from Ethiopia, the Eritrean fighters of the EPLF (Eritrean People’s Liberation Front) received their only support from Somalia and Sudan; for this reason, Asmara considers them brotherly countries to be stood by. Despite over twenty years of Western sanctions—imposed on the false charge of supporting al-Shabaab (a paradox, given that Eritrea had fought and defeated al-Qaeda years earlier, and al-Shabaab was created by the joint action of Ethiopian and American intelligence following Ethiopia’s 2006 intervention in Somalia)—Eritrea has managed on its own to train over 25,000 officers for the new Somali army. Eritrea has not yet spoken regarding the recognition of Somaliland*, unlike other countries, but this should not surprise us: Asmara does not speak; it acts. And it is precisely this that most disturbs those regional and international actors (from Ethiopia to Israel, the UAE to the US) who have always seen Eritrea as their primary and most strategic adversary between the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

*Update. Shortly after the publication of this article, the Eritrean Ministry of Information issued a brief and cryptic statement, explicitly mentioning the strict equivalence between the One China Policy and the One Somalia Policy. Far more than a mere invitation or suggestion to Beijing—the primary superpower called upon to voice its opposition to this grave violation of international law—it serves as a stark warning to the “international community” and, above all, to the sponsors of Somaliland’s separatism: do not play with fire.